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A cybersecurity risk assessment for a Saudi hospital: why privileged access came first: Cybersecurity risk assessment case study.

Case study: an evidence-based cybersecurity risk assessment of a large Saudi hospital against NCA ECC, the PDPL, ISO 27001 and CIS, and how it set priorities.

Director, Sumrite
3 min read العربية
Sumrite case study card: cybersecurity risk assessment of a large Saudi hospital
Cybersecurity risk assessment · Saudi hospital · Sumrite case study
On this page
  1. What a risk assessment adds to a penetration test
  2. Scope and method
  3. What the hospital does well
  4. Where the gaps were, in order
    1. 1. Identity and privileged access
    2. 2. Applications and operational technology
    3. 3. Governance and third-party risk
    4. 4. Network, perimeter and email
    5. 5. Detection and response
  5. From findings to a plan
  6. Takeaways for Saudi and UAE healthcare
  7. Frequently asked questions

What a risk assessment adds to a penetration test

A penetration test shows which doors are open. A risk assessment shows why they stay open: who owns patching, whether privileged accounts are controlled, whether vendors are vetted, whether the SOC would notice. Here the two fed each other: the unpatched servers found in the internal network test traced back to gaps in governance and vulnerability management.

Scope and method

The assessment covered cybersecurity governance, third-party risk, Active Directory, identity and access, privileged access, firewall, network, EDR and NDR, SOC capability, email security, application security, and operational technology such as building and medical device networks.

It ran in stages: scoping, control testing against documents, interviews and system evidence, evidence review and risk validation, independent quality review, and final reporting.

A control passed only when its implementation was demonstrated. Where evidence was incomplete, inconsistent or unavailable, it was rated as a gap. This is how NCA ECC auditors work, and it is why the result is defensible.

What the hospital does well

Strengths were listed only where evidence supported them:

  • Active Directory: supported, patched, dedicated domain controllers, with offline backups and a tested recovery
  • Endpoint and network detection: anti-ransomware in prevent mode, one-click isolation and round-the-clock monitoring
  • Email: phishing-resistant MFA prompts, modern TLS only and external auto-forwarding blocked
  • Governance: regular NCA ECC audits, disaster-recovery exercises and NCA threat intelligence

Where the gaps were, in order

1. Identity and privileged access

The main route to full compromise, and the area where controls could least be evidenced. Priority actions: bring every privileged account under PAM, remove permanent and excessive privileges, enforce MFA and session monitoring, remove dormant and shared accounts, formalise joiner-mover-leaver, rotate the KRBTGT password, retire weak Kerberos encryption and NTLMv1, and detect Kerberoasting in the SIEM.

2. Applications and operational technology

No formal application security programme could be evidenced, which matches the issues found in the portal penetration test. For OT, the priorities were separating it from corporate IT, restricting remote access with MFA, and removing default credentials.

3. Governance and third-party risk

Board approval of the cybersecurity strategy, a CISO reporting to leadership, a formal risk register, an approved vendor-risk policy with tiering, and a risk assessment of each active vendor before renewal.

4. Network, perimeter and email

Segmenting critical systems, removing overly permissive firewall rules with senior approval for broad rules, intrusion detection on critical segments, and enforced SPF, DKIM and DMARC.

5. Detection and response

Round-the-clock monitoring or approved after-hours compensating controls, every critical log source in the SIEM, and playbooks for ransomware and account compromise.

From findings to a plan

The plan for management was short:

  1. Approve the Priority 1 list
  2. Give every item a named owner and a closure date
  3. Work in order of urgency, identity first
  4. Submit evidence for controls that exist but were not evidenced
  5. Review status at every management meeting, reassess, then move on

Takeaways for Saudi and UAE healthcare

  • Passing an NCA ECC audit is a floor, not proof that controls work.
  • Privileged access and vendors are where evidence most often fails.
  • Evidence is the fastest fix. Some gaps close as soon as the proof is collected.
  • Pair the assessment with a penetration test so technical findings and control gaps explain each other.

Sumrite runs risk assessments and VAPT for healthcare, finance and government suppliers in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. See our NCA ECC guide and Saudi PDPL guide, or read this case study in Arabic.

Frequently asked questions

What does a cybersecurity risk assessment cover?

It tests whether security controls exist and work across governance, third-party risk, identity, privileged access, Active Directory, network, firewall, email, endpoint and network detection, the SOC, application security and operational technology.

Which standards is a Saudi hospital risk assessment mapped to?

This assessment mapped every control to the NCA Essential Cybersecurity Controls, the Saudi Personal Data Protection Law, ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A and CIS Controls v8, so each finding traces to a requirement the hospital is measured against.

Why rate a control as a gap when the evidence is missing?

Because an auditor will. A control passes only when its implementation is demonstrated. That is conservative, but it also means controls that exist and were not evidenced can be closed quickly by supplying the evidence.

Why was privileged access the top priority?

Privileged accounts are the main route from a single compromise to full control of the environment, and privileged access controls could not be evidenced. Identity, PAM and Active Directory therefore led the plan.

See all FAQs →

  • Healthcare
  • Risk Assessment
  • NCA ECC
  • PDPL
  • ISO 27001
  • PAM
  • Saudi Arabia

Faisal Khan

Faisal Khan is a Director at Sumrite, where he oversees penetration testing, risk assessment and compliance engagements for SaaS and enterprise clients.

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