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The Android app
The app gives patients access to appointments, records and results. It was tested grey-box against OWASP MASVS and MASTG with test accounts from the hospital.
| Issue | What an attacker gains |
|---|---|
| Debuggable build in production | Attach a debugger, read memory, change behaviour at runtime |
| No root detection | Run the app on a rooted device with full control |
| No certificate pinning | Decrypt and alter all API traffic with a proxy |
| Remote WebView debugging enabled | Inspect and script the app’s web views |
| No obfuscation or anti-instrumentation | Read the logic and hook functions with tools such as Frida |
| AES in ECB mode | Patterns in encrypted data stay visible |
With pinning absent, an intercepting proxy decrypted the app’s calls to its API and showed complete responses. On a shared Wi-Fi network or a compromised device, that is a patient’s data in clear view.
How to fix it
- Release a non-debuggable build, with WebView debugging disabled.
- Pin the API certificate or public key, with a backup pin and a rotation plan.
- Add root, emulator and instrumentation detection, and limit sensitive features when they trigger.
- Replace AES/ECB with an authenticated mode such as AES-GCM.
- Obfuscate the release build and raise the minimum supported Android version.
Most of these are build settings, not rewrites. The API the app calls was tested too, because most real damage happens on the server. See mobile app VAPT and API security testing.
DDoS resilience of the patient portal
The portal was tested with a bounded Layer-7 load test in a window the hospital approved, with agreed limits on rate and duration. The good news: it stayed available throughout. The concern: no rate limiting or DDoS mitigation engaged at any point, and responses slowed noticeably under load. A real attacker would not stop at an agreed limit.
Fix: put the portal behind a DDoS protection service or WAF with per-client rate limits on login, one-time code and search endpoints, and keep the origin reachable only through it.
What Gulf healthcare providers should check in their apps
- Release builds are not debuggable, with WebView debugging off
- Certificate or key pinning on every API call
- Root, emulator and hooking detection
- Modern encryption modes, no ECB
- Rate limits on login, one-time codes and every public endpoint
- Origin servers hidden behind DDoS protection
Frequently asked questions
Why is a debuggable Android build so serious?
A debuggable app lets anyone with the phone attach a debugger, read memory, change values at runtime and bypass checks in the app. In a healthcare app that handles patient data and sessions, it removes most of the protection the app has on the device.
What does certificate pinning protect against?
Without pinning, an app trusts any certificate the phone trusts. An attacker who installs their own certificate on a device, or controls a network, can decrypt the app's traffic. Pinning makes the app accept only the server's own certificate or key.
What is a bounded DDoS resilience test?
A controlled load test against a live service in an approved window, with agreed limits on rate and duration, to see whether rate limiting and DDoS protection engage. It measures resilience without taking the service down.
Which standard covers mobile app security testing?
OWASP MASVS defines the security requirements and OWASP MASTG the test procedures. Sumrite maps every mobile finding to them.
