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Anyone could rename a UAE firm's staff in its client portal: Web application and API penetration test case study.

Case study: a web app and API test for a UAE consulting firm found staff-record tampering, email enumeration and PII in tokens. All were fixed and retested.

Senior Consultant, Sumrite
3 min read العربية
Sumrite case study card: web application and API penetration test for a UAE consulting firm
Web app and API penetration test · UAE consulting firm · Sumrite case study
On this page
  1. The client and the scope
  2. What we found
    1. Anyone could rename the firm’s staff
    2. An API that confirmed which emails exist
    3. Personal data in tokens and responses
    4. Debug mode and stack traces in production
  3. Retest: every issue closed
  4. Lessons for UAE businesses with client portals
  5. Frequently asked questions

The client and the scope

The firm runs an online platform where clients find and book its consultants. Staff profiles are pulled from the firm’s Active Directory, and the platform is used daily by clients across the UAE. The test covered the production web application and its API, following the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide and the OWASP Top 10, with every finding confirmed by hand.

What we found

Anyone could rename the firm’s staff

The endpoint that updates a profile accepted extra fields it was never meant to take. By adding a name field to the request and pointing it at another staff record, a tester could change the displayed name of any consultant pulled from the directory.

On a platform where clients choose who to trust with their information, being able to rename or impersonate staff is a phishing and fraud tool. It is a form of IDOR: the server trusted an identifier and a field from the client instead of checking who was allowed to change what.

Fix: an allow-list of fields each role may change, server-side authorisation on every update, and directory attributes treated as read-only from the web.

An API that confirmed which emails exist

An account endpoint had no rate limiting, and its responses differed depending on whether an email address was registered. Automating requests produced a list of valid accounts, the first step in password spraying and targeted phishing.

Fix: per-client rate limits and lockout, a challenge after repeated attempts, and one generic response whether or not the account exists.

Personal data in tokens and responses

The session token (JWT) and several API responses carried names, email addresses and phone numbers the front end never displayed. A JWT is signed, not encrypted, so anyone holding one can read it.

Fix: keep only an opaque user ID in the token, return only the fields each screen needs, and review API responses for over-sharing. Under the UAE Personal Data Protection Law, data minimisation is a requirement, not a nice-to-have.

Debug mode and stack traces in production

Malformed requests returned stack traces with file paths and function names, and debug mode exposed more internal detail. Alongside a possible host header injection and unnecessary HTTP methods, this gave an attacker a free map of the application.

Fix: turn off debug mode in production, return generic errors and log the detail server-side, validate the Host header against an allow-list, and disable unused HTTP methods.

Retest: every issue closed

The firm’s developers fixed each finding, and Sumrite retested using the same requests that proved the original issues. Every fix held: the profile endpoint now rejects extra fields, the account endpoint is rate limited with a generic response, tokens no longer carry personal data, and errors no longer leak internals. The final report shows what was found and that all of it is closed, which is what clients and auditors want to see.

Lessons for UAE businesses with client portals

  • Never let the client decide which fields it may change. Allow-list them on the server.
  • Rate limit every authentication and account endpoint, and keep responses identical for valid and invalid accounts.
  • Keep personal data out of tokens. Signed is not encrypted.
  • Ship production builds without debug output.
  • Retest after fixing. A fix that has not been retested is a hope, not a control.

Sumrite tests web applications and APIs for businesses in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and across the UAE. See VAPT services in Dubai and the UAE, or read this case study in Arabic.

Frequently asked questions

What is parameter tampering in a web application?

Parameter tampering is changing or adding fields in a request that the application did not expect the user to control. If the server applies them without checking, a user can change data they should not own, such as another person's profile or a staff member's name.

Why does a missing rate limit matter on a login or reset endpoint?

Without a rate limit, an attacker can send thousands of automated requests and learn from the responses which email addresses have accounts. That list feeds password spraying and targeted phishing.

Is it a problem to put personal data in a JWT?

Yes. A JWT is only signed, not encrypted by default, so anyone holding the token can read its contents. Names, emails and phone numbers do not belong in it; store an opaque user ID and look the rest up on the server.

Does the UAE PDPL require penetration testing?

The UAE Personal Data Protection Law requires appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal data. A penetration test is how organisations prove those measures work on the systems that hold the data.

See all FAQs →

  • UAE
  • Dubai
  • Web Application
  • API Security
  • IDOR
  • JWT
  • Rate Limiting

Niyaz Khan

Niyaz Khan is a Senior Consultant at Sumrite, working on web application, API and infrastructure security testing and the hardening guidance that follows each engagement.

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